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CORPORATIONS
FIDUCIARY DUTY OWED CREDITORS BY DIRECTOR OF INSOLVENT
CORPORATION
The Calton Crescent Company had been insolvent since its incorporation
in 1933. Between 1942 and 1946 one of the company directors, Becker, pur-
chased debentures of the company from creditors at a discount.1 In an ar-
rangement proceeding under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act2 the referee
prorated Becker's claims at face value. This order was affirmed by the
district court3 and by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.4  The
Manufacturer's Trust Company, trustee under the indenture pursuant to
which the debentures were issued, was granted certiorari to the Supreme
Court. The trustee contended that, because the debentures were purchased
during insolvency, Becker had violated a fiduciary duty owed to the creditors,
and that his claims should be limited to the price he paid for the debentures.
The Court held that there was no evidence of over-reaching by Becker such
as would constitute a breach of a fiduciary duty, and affirmed the order.
Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 70 Sup. Ct. 127 (1949).
The unusual character of the corporate entity raises many problems as to
the relationship of the director to persons interested in the successful operation
of the corporation and in its assets after insolvency. Where the corporation
is solvent the relation between the director and a creditor is generally regarded
non-fiduciary.5 Nor is the director a fiduciary to the stockholders under the
majority view.6 But an increasing minority has, by the "special circum-
stances" rule, imposed a fiduciary obligation upon the director where his ac-
1. In purchasing the claims Becker acted as agent for his wife and mother. Under
these circumstances the court concluded that proofs of debt filed by the Becker women
should be treated as if they were proofs of debt filed by Becker. Manufacturers Trust
Co. v. Becker, 70 Sup. Ct. 127, 131 (1949).
2. 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 701 (1938).
3. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 80 F. Supp. 822 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
4. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 173 F. 2d 944 (2d Cir. 1949).
5. Frost Manufacturing Co. v. Foster, 76 Iowa 535, 41 N. W. 212 (1889) ; Allen v.
Cochran, 160 La. 425, 107 So. 292 (1926) ; Young v. Haviland, 215 Mass. 120, 102 N. E.
339 (1913) ; Union National Bank v. Hill, 148 Mo. 380, 39 S. W. 101 (1899) ; Zinn v.
Mendel, 9 W. Va. 580 (1876); cf. Whitfield v. Kern, 122 N. J. 332, 192 Atl. 48 (1937).
There is an exception to this rule in the case of corporate banking companies. Delano v.
Case, 121 Ill. 247, 12 N. E. 676 (1887); Cassidy v. Uhlmann, 170 N. Y. 505, 63 N. E.
554 (1902) ; Marshall v. F. M. Say. Bank of Alexandria, 85 Va. 676, 8 S. E. 586 (1889).
6. Indiana follows the majority rule. See Ryan, Should Tippecanoe County Coinlis-
sioners v. Reynolds Be O'verruled?, 16 IND. L. J. 563 (1941). Other cases following the
majority rule are: Steinfield v. Nelson, 51 Ariz. 242, 139 Pac. 879 (1913) ; Hooker v.
Midland Steel Co., 215 Ill. 444, 74 N. E. 445 (1905) ; Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 188
N. W. 266 (1922) ; Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N. J. 656, 23 Atl. 426 (1891) ; Shaw v. Cole
Manufacturing Co., 132 Tenn. 210, 177 S. W. 479 (1915). Cases following the minority
rule imposing a fiduciary relationship between a director and a stockholder are: Oliver v.
Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1903) ; Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531
(1932) ; Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 202 N. W. 955 (1925).
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tions make it inequitable for him to profit at the stockholders' expense.7 The
director is generally held to be a fiduciary to the corporate entity," though his
duties are not as stringently enforced as are those owed by a trustee to the
cestui que trust. Thus, a director may purchase discounted claims against
a solvent corporation and enforce them at their face value so long as he acts
in good faith and is under no present duty to make the purchase for the
corporation.9
But when a corporation becomes insolvent, creditors are substituted for
the corporation and the director becomes a trustee of the corporate assets for
their benefit.' This is the situation posed by the Manufacturers Trust case.
The Court, finding no over-reaching by Becker, rejected the trustee's conten-
tion that Becker's fiduciary duty should be strictly enforced,"- and utilized a
7. Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909) ; Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F.2d
147 (2d Cir. 1925) ; Bacon v. Soule, 19 Cal. App. 428, 126 Pac. 384 (1912) ; Agatucci v.
Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153, 63 N. E.2d 630 (1943), 24 CHI-KENT REV. 272 (1946) ; Good-
win v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N. E. 659 (1933), 32 Mica. L. REv. 678 (1934). See
also Berle, Publicity of Accounts and Directors' Purchases of Stock, 25 MIcH. L. REv.
827 (1927) ; Comment, 19 So. CALIF. L. REv. 32 (1945) ; Notes, 14 MINN. L. REv. 530
(1930), 4 U. OF NEWARK L. REv. 441 (1939), 11 Wis. L. REv. 547 (1936).
8. Bates v. Dresser, 251 U. S. 524 (1920) ; Barnes v. Andrews, 298 Fed. 614 (S. D.
N. Y. 1924) ; Mobile Land Improvement Co. v. Goss, 142 Ala. 520, 39 So. 229 (1905) ;
New Haven Trust Co. v. Doherty, 75 Conn. 555, 54 Atl. 209 (1903) ; Hun v. Cary, 82
N. Y. 65 (1880) ; Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate
Managers Practicable? 2 U. OF CHl. L. REv. 194 (1935) ; Fuller, Restrictions Imposed by
the Directorship Status on the Personal Business Activities of Directors, 26 WASH. U.
L. Q. 189 (1941); Uhlman, The Legal Status of Corporate Directors, 19 B. U. L. REV.
12 (1939).
9. Kroegher v. Calinada Conolization Co., 119 Fed. 641 (3d Cir. 1902) ; Alexandrine
Hotel Co. v. Whaling, 313 Mich. 15, 20 N. W.2d 793 (1945); Wabunga Land Co. v.
Schwarbeck, 245 Mich. 505, 222 N. W. 707 (1929) ; Punch v. Hipolite Co., 340 Mo. 53,
100 S. W.2d 878 (1936) ; Glenwood Manufacturing Co. v. Syme, 109 Wis. 355, 85 N. W.
432 (1901). Contra: Davis v. The Rock Creek L. F. & M. Co., 55 Cal. 359 (1880) ;
Duane v. Merchants Legal Stamp Co., 227 Mass. 551, 116 N. E. 875 (1917); McDonald v.
Houghton, 70 N. C. 316 (1874). See also, 2 THoiiPsoN, COORATIO S § 1343 -(3d ed.
1927); Lake, The Use For Personal Profit of Knowledge Gained While a Director, 9
Miss. L. J. 427 (1937) ; Riley, Corporation's Right to Profits Made by Director, 4 MIrN.
L. REv. 513 (1920) ; Note, 26 IOWA L. REv. 334 (1941).
10. E.g., In re The Van Sweringen Co., 119 F.2d 231, 234 (6th Cir. 1941) ; Martin v.
Chambers, 214 Fed. 769, 771 (5th Cir. 1914) ; In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,
46 F. Supp. 77, 88 (S. D. Cal. 1941) ; Homer v. New South Oilmill, 130 Ark. 551, 197
S. W. 1163, 1165 (1917) ; Bonney v. Tilley, 109 Cal. 346, 352, 42 Pac. 439, 440 (1896) ;
Farwell v. Pyle National Electric Co., 289 Il. 157, 164, 124 N. E. 449, 452 (1919);
Powell v. Willamette Val. R. Co., 15 Ore. 393, 15 Pac. 663, 666 (1887) ; 3 FLETCHER, CYC.
CORORATIONs § 869.1 (Perm. ed. 1947) ; 2 THomPsoN CORPRATrONS § 1344 (3d ed. 1927).
11. The few cases there are that deal with this particular question have all allowed
the creditors the benefit of profits made by the director when dealing with other creditors.
Bonney v. Tilley, 109 Cal. 346, 42 Pac. 439 (1935) ; Bulkley v. Whitcomb, 121 N. Y. 107,
24 N. E. 13 (1890). In Moulton v. Connell-Hall-McLester Co., 93 Tenn. 377, 27 S. W.
672 (1894) the court decided for the director, but this judgment was based on a procedural
point inasmuch as plaintiff creditor was suing for himself and not for the benefit of all
the creditors. In Appeal of Hammond, 123 Pa. 503, 16 Atl. 419 (1889) a director pur-
chased claims after the corporate property was assigned to a trustee in bankruptcy. The
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less vigorous rule similar to that applied to the relation between a director
and a solvent corporation.12 The Court conceded that the duty would be
strictly enforced if judicial proceedings in bankruptcy were imminent.'13
Under this reasoning it is possible that Becker violated no duty owing to the
creditors, since his purchases did not deplete the fund available for dividends
and did not injure the creditors, who received no less than they would have
in the absence of the purchase. Nor would the seller-creditors succeed in re-
covering Becker's profits since it was generally known at the time of the
purchase that land values were increasing. 4 As a result of the decision, the
director was allowed a profit of $42,000 on an investment of $8,000 while the
creditors received a dividend of 43.61% on the face value of their claims.
Had the director been allowed only the price he paid for the debentures the
dividend would have mounted to over 80% of the face value of the creditors'
claims. 5
The assumption by the majority opinion that the same rule is applicable
to both the solvent and the insolvent corporation is difficult to sustain.'0
When the claim against a solvent corporation is purchased, it is apparent that
at the time the debenture was issued the corporation received full value for
its obligation to repay1 7  It is, therefore, reasonable to allow the profits to
the director because the corporation has incurred no loss. It is felt that the
allowance of profits to the director increases his incentive, resulting in better
management, and thereby benefiting the stockholders, employees, and the
community. But when insolvency occurs, the creditors are substituted for the
corporation, 8 and they should be allowed to alleviate some of their losses
resulting from the insolvency.' 9 Despite the absence of any direct injury,
they are equitably entitled to the director's profits. The creditors, of course,
are not always in this superior position. Should the director purchase claims
in the belief that he can relieve the corporation of its insolvent condition by
court held that inasmuch as the claims were purchased at a time when the defendant was
no longer a director of the corporation, the complaining creditors, not having been injured
by the transaction, had no standing in court.
12. "That there is no such conflict (between a director's personal interest and his
duty to the corporation) in the ordinary case of the purchase by a director in a going
corporation of its outstanding obligations would seem true not only of solvent corpora-
tions." Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 70 Sup. Ct. 127, 132 (1949).
13. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 70 Sup. Ct. 127, 133 (1949).
14. The director made his purchase during the years 1942 to 1946.
15. See note 13 supra, at 129.
16. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 173 F.2d 944, 950 (2d Cir. 1949).
17. In the present case the corporation received value in the form of a cancellation
of a mortgage by the mortgagees in return for the debenture bonds it issued.
18. See note 10 supra.
19. Cf. Martin v. Chambers, 214 Fed. 769 (5th Cir. 1904) ; Bonney v. Tilley, 109
Cal. 346, 42 Pac. 439 (1935) ; Bramblet v. Commonwealth Land & Lbr. Co., 26 Ky. 1176,
83 S. W. 599 (1904) ; Bulkley v. Whitcomb, 121 N. Y. 107, 24 N. E. 13 (1890).
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a composition agreement he may share in the corporate assets on the same
basis as do the other creditors.2 0 This result is justified by the same consider-
ations as those allowing the director to speculate in the securities of a solvent
corporation; because it increases his incentives, incidentally benefiting other
interested parties.21 Since the creditors' interests are inferior to the combined
interests of others, the director is placed on a par with the creditors. But if
the director purchases claims without expectation of composition, the stock-
holders, employees, and the community are not necessarily the incidental
beneficiaries, since the purpose of the transaction is not to alleviate the
insolvency.22  Here the creditors' interests outweigh those of the director,
and the director's recovery should be limited to the purchase price of the
claims.23
The only limitation imposed upon the director of an insolvent corporation
by this latest decision concerns that situation where judicial proceedings in
liquidation are imminent. Since directors have some discretion in fixing the
time of such proceedings,24 there is a conflict between his personal motives
and his fiduciary duty. The director will be inclined to delay judicial proceed-
ings if he knows he can make added profits through subsequent dealings in
corporate securities. Such a delay may work to reduce the return to the
creditors on their initial loan.2' The imposition of a strict fiduciary obliga-
20. A director will be protected if his sole purpose in purchasing the claims is to
enable the corporation to continue in business. Powell v. Willamette Val. R. Co., 15 Ore.
393, 15 Pac. 663 (1887) ; accord, Alexandrine Hotel Co. v. Whaling, 313 Mich. 15, 20
N. W.2d 793 (1945) ; Punch v. Hipolite Co., 340 Mo. 53, 100 S. W.2d 793 (1945) ; Glen-
wood Mfg. Co. v. Syme, 109 Wis. 355, 85 N. W. 432 (1901). On the other hand if a
company is in the act of reorganization, a director is not protected if he purchases claims
with a view toward personal profit. In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 46 F.
Supp. 77 (S. D. Cal. 1941) ; In re McCrary Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 267 (S. D. N. Y.
1935), 34 MICH. L. REv. 1245 (1935).
21. See, In re Calton Crescent, 173 F.2d 944, 952 (2d Cir. 1949) (dissenting opinion).
22. A director is allowed to protect his personal investment in an insolvent corpora-
tion by purchasing secured claims against the corporation in order to forestall foreclosure
proceedings. In such a case he will be allowed his pro rata share at face value since the
director's intent was not only to protect his own interests but also the interests of others
by relieving the corporation of its insolvent condition. Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725
(10th Cir. 1943); Martin v. Chambers, 214 Fed. 769 (5th Cir. 1914); Beaumont v.
Folsom, 136 Neb. 235, 285 N. W. 547 (1939). On the question of personal interest versus
fiduciary duty see C. and E. Rohrlich, Psychological Foundations for the Fiduciary Con-
cept in Corporation Law, 38 COL. L. RFv. 432 (1938).
23. Accord, In re The Van Sweringen Co., 119 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1941); United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Eichel, 219 Fed. 803 (3d Cir. 1915); In re Jersey
Materials Co., 50 F. Supp. 428 (D. N. J. 1943) ; Bonney v. Tilley, 109 Cal. 346, 42 Pac.
439 (1895) ; Bramblet v. Commonwealth Land & Lbr., Co., 26 Ky. 1176, 83 S. W. 599
(1904) ; Bulkley v. Whitcomb, 121 N. Y. 107, 24 N. E. 13 (1890) ; Appeal of Hammond,
123 Pa. 503, 16 Atl. 419 (1889).
24. Royal Indemnity Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 165 (1933);
In re De Camp Glass Casket Co., 272 Fed. 558 (6th Cir. 1921) ; Note, 50 HARv. L. REV.
662 (1937).
25. See, Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 70 Sup. Ct. 127, 133 (1949) (dissenting
opinion).
